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Corporate governance incentives at too-big-to-fail financial firms deserve systematic examination. For industrial conglomerates that have grown too large to be
efficient, internal and external corporate structural pressures push to resize the firm.
External activists press the firm to restructure to raise its stock market value. Inside
the firm, boards and managers see that the too-big firm can be more efficient and
more profitable if restructured via spinoffs and sales. But a major corrective for
industrial firm overexpansion fails to constrain large, too-big-to-fail financial firms
when (1) the funding boost that the firm captures by being too-big-to-fail sufficiently
lowers the firm’s financing costs and (2) a resized firm or the spun-off entities
would lose that funding benefit. Propositions (1) and (2) have both been true and,
consequently, a major retardant to industrial firm overexpansion has gone missing
for large financial firms. The effect resembles that of a corporate poison pill, but one
that disrupts the actions of both outsiders and insiders.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance controls help to keep firms competitive and efficient. They work imperfectly and at times do not work at all, but overall
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they push large firms to perform better. Persistently poor results induce a
firm’s board of directors to assess the firm’s internal organization to see if it
needs restructuring. Shareholders often agitate for change; corporate
funding costs rise and constrain managers from continuing down an unprofitable path; and, at the limit, activist shareholders agitate for the firm to
be broken up into separate, more tightly organized parts.
But these corporate controls deteriorate in too-big-to-fail financial firms.
The most powerful corporate governance control in recent decades has been
the corporate takeover and breakup of a too-large industrial firm into its
constituent parts, which induced American industrial conglomerates to
boldly restructure in the 1980s. If financial firms today were subject to such
pressure, then firms that become too big would face shareholder breakup
efforts, some of which would succeed. In this Article, I first analyze the
interaction between financial corporate structure and the breakup takeover—
the strongest corporate governance tool, despite its ongoing rarity—to
explain why the strongest tool in the corporate governance toolbox cannot
work for too-big-to-fail firms. More tellingly, most day-to-day corporate
pressures and controls for boards to resize, spin off, and restructure also
cannot work well, or at all, in the too-big-to-fail financial firm.
The explanation—that too-big-to-fail finance is restructuring-proof—is
not yet integral to the analytics of the too-big-to-fail problem. Its core
explanation is as follows: The likelihood that big finance will be bailed out
in a crisis lowers the financial firms’ cost of funding. These lower financing
costs redound to the benefit of the firms’ shareholders. This much is well
known. But then the implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy operates as a shadow
poison pill, resembling the governance defense that managers and boards
have used successfully for the past quarter-century to ward off unwanted
takeovers in the industrial sector. The traditional poison pill dilutes only the
offeror’s stock, thereby discouraging offers to buy the target company.
Hence, the conventional pill impedes outsiders, but not insiders. In contrast,
the too-big-to-fail “pill” also impedes insiders—a controlling shareholder
where there is one, the board of directors, and the CEO—from restructuring
the firm, even if such a restructuring would be operationally wise.
An operationally successful restructuring of such a too-big-to-fail financial firm will increase the firm’s (or its spun-off divisions’) overall value to
the economy, but it will decrease the private value of the firm’s stock to the
extent the restructuring strengthens the constituent firms enough—or
makes them sufficiently small that they are no longer too-big-to-fail. If the
constituent parts would no longer be too big, then, as long as the expected
value of the subsidy lost exceeds that of the restructuring gains, stockholders
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lack the incentive to restructure the firm and have reason to oppose even
operationally efficient changes that would result in the loss of that subsidy.
Corporate governance at the too-big-to-fail financial firm degrades. The
benefited firm need not even be aware that the profitability of a line of
business depends on the too-big-to-fail boost; it just finds that operational
change in the subsidized environment is unprofitable.
This corporate degradation hurts the economy as a whole. Just as a monopolist will invest to protect its monopoly benefits up to the private profit
the monopoly provides the firm, a too-big-to-fail firm will sacrifice its own
efficiency—along with the efficiency of the economy’s financial system—up
to the cost of its subsidy advantage. The full size of the too-big-to-fail
subsidy—estimated after the financial crisis to be in the tens of billions of
dollars annually—can thereby be lost to the economy, allowing the too-bigto-fail firm to take on activities that could be handled more efficiently
elsewhere in the economy.
In Part I, I describe the 2012–2013 controversy over JPMorgan Chase’s
London Whale and the bank’s $6 billion trading loss, which embarrassed the
firm, derailed previously successful executives’ careers, and led to congressional investigations and negative media attention. The managerial lapse
induced two contrasting classes of responses: One sought more regulation
because even America’s strongest big bank could make a major mistake. The
other dismissed the problem as a huge loss for shareholders and managers,
but one whose size was well within both JPMorgan Chase’s $20 billion in
annual earnings and its $200 billion of bank capital. Similarly, respected
commentators argued that although big finance has become too large to be
efficient, market forces will eventually induce the too-big financial firms to
resize.
In Part II, I analyze the conceptual impact of the too-big-to-fail subsidy
on financial firms’ cost of funding, which operates as a powerful corporate
poison pill. The subsidy destroys takeover value for a shareholder who
would buy up the firm’s stock and break up a far-too-big banking conglomerate. Less dramatically, but more importantly, the potential loss of the toobig-to-fail subsidy also reduces the value of day-to-day corporate restructuring
strategies that managers and boards might otherwise pursue. Managers at
an orphaned subsidiary might, for example, seek financing to buy those
operations out from the financial conglomerate, believing they can run the
spun-off operation better than the far-off senior managers at the bank’s
headquarters. But the buyout’s funding would not garner the too-big-to-fail
subsidy that the entire financial firm gets. Hence, the divisional managers
and their financial backers face higher financing costs and cannot buy out a
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division even if the buyout would otherwise be profitable and operationally
wise. The too-big-to-fail “pill” degrades both internal and external incentives to build better, stronger corporate structures. Importantly, the firm’s
senior managers need not seek the too-big-to-fail subsidy—and may even
deny its existence—but the subsidy will still drive their fundamental
structural decisions, as they weigh the costs and benefits of restructuring.
In Part III, I examine too-big-to-fail data, which measures what the toobig firm saves on its borrowings due to lowered funding costs. Reconfiguring
the existing data as a percentage of shareholder profits shows estimates that
the financial crisis led to the too-big-to-fail subsidy increasing financial
firms’ profits by about one-third beyond what they would otherwise have
been. The overall picture is of a subsidy amounting then to the size of the
takeover premium needed to motivate a takeover. If this level persists,
operationally efficient internal restructurings to downsize or spin off will
often not make economic sense to the firm, its managers, or its shareholders.
In Part IV, I examine related economic concepts emanating from antitrust analysis of the costs of monopoly. Applying that thinking to financial
firms shows how the extended costs of too-big-to-fail can put a protective
umbrella over degraded organizational integrity, shielding it from pressures
to fix it. Moreover, an oligopoly protective umbrella can impede restructuring
apart from the too-big-to-fail umbrella for reasons similar to the too-big-tofail analytic, if restructuring would cause the firm to lose those oligopoly
profits. The main results of this Article can be reached without a too-big-tofail subsidy, if there is an oligopolistic financial sector.
In Part V, we examine other, parallel degradation due to too-big-to-fail
status, including excessive leverage, regulatory degradation, inability to raise
new capital, and other social costs. While these risk-based regulatory
problems arising from too-big-to-fail finance have been well examined, the
corporate governance problems of boards, breakups, spinoffs, and the like
have not.
In Part VI, I examine the public policy implications, opportunities, and
difficulties, focusing on incentive effects and fixes. The ongoing policy
efforts fall into two main categories: command-and-control instructions to
increase financial firm capital and limit firms’ riskiest activities, and stronger
failure resolution mechanisms that make failure an option for big financial
firms. Each category—command-and-control and making failure an option—
could reduce the too-big-to-fail problem. The structural degradation
analytic further justifies those efforts.
The corporate governance incentive analytics here also suggest a further,
largely undiscussed policy foray: policymakers can alter the internal incentives
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of shareholders, boards, and managers, making their incentives better match
the public interest, primarily by making risky debt more expensive for the
financial firm. I outline how this could be achieved. American finance could
be improved by using all three categories of policy tools. As of now, it uses
only two.
In Part VII, I consider what big finance would look like without the toobig-to-fail subsidy. Firms with shareholder-centered corporate governance
did worse in the financial crisis than firms with weak shareholder orientation, and the analytics here show why that was so and why, without the
subsidy, they should have done better. The policy implication of the degradation conceptualized here is not to further unleash shareholders with
distorted incentives inside big finance, but rather to reorient their incentives
to reduce the distortions and thereby better align shareholders’ incentives
with the public’s.
Lastly, I sketch out the dealmaking impact if the too-big firms’ funding
boost disappears—as industry proponents and some analysts say has already
been, or will shortly be, achieved. Normal corporate processes would press
to restructure and downsize the biggest and least efficient firms. Ending the
subsidy, or even cutting back the big increase from the financial crisis,
should unleash the usual market mechanisms that facilitate right-sizing of
corporations. Board and managerial incentives would better match public
goals. If better regulation slashes the large too-big-to-fail subsidy that we
have had, then big finance should restructure on its own.
The change we would see could include dramatic, activist-driven
breakups and spinoffs, but much of the corporate governance effort would
be slow and internal: new ventures would need a higher hurdle rate to be
justified, while some major old ventures would become uncompetitive and
then be sold. This latter, internal process would not be a dramatic, nearly
instant revolutionary restructuring, but a steady, multiyear evolutionary
rebuilding of the biggest financial firms—a rebuilding that would make the
American financial system safer, stronger, and better for the American
economy.
I. THE LONDON WHALE AND JPMORGAN’S $6 BILLION
TRADING LOSS
A. The Events and the Corporate Governance Failure
The London Whale debacle is now well known in financial circles.
JPMorgan Chase, America’s largest bank, is reputed to be America’s bestmanaged bank, with the widely respected Jamie Dimon as its chief executive
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officer. Yet, despite its reputation, mismanaged trades—initiated by the
London Whale—lost the bank $6 billion. (In professional poker, and sometimes in financial markets, a “whale” is a poor player with a thick wallet.)
When the economy improved after the 2007–2009 financial crisis,
JPMorgan concluded it was prudent to reduce its exposure to credit derivatives
whose value depended on a weak economy. Because of illiquidity in that
market, JPMorgan traders decided not to sell the positions they had already
taken, but instead to buy new, opposite positions, although with different
maturities.1 A JPMorgan trader based in London—the Whale—made many
of these trades.2 However, as credit markets rallied in early 2012, the
original positions lost even more value, and the new positions’ profits did
not make up for those continued losses. Worse, the larger portfolio became
too big, too complex, and too unwieldy to manage well. JPMorgan owned
too much of this market, and when management finally decided to unwind
the trades by selling many off, it found that there were no longer enough
buyers. JPMorgan itself had been the primary buyer in many of the underlying
markets, and the assets could not be sold at desirable prices.3
JPMorgan’s first public accounting pegged the loss at $2 billion, about
one-tenth of the bank’s annual profit. Questions immediately arose as to the
quality of JPMorgan’s risk management team—previously reputed to be
stellar—since they had allowed the bank to be cornered with such a large
position. If JPMorgan could not manage these risks appropriately, how
would less well-managed banks fare? As the story unfolded, JPMorgan’s
losses mounted. By the time the bank had closed out its position, it had lost
$6 billion.
Congress and the media excoriated Dimon and JPMorgan’s senior management for failing to control the original trades, for failing to wind them
down at lower loss levels, for being uninformed about the full extent of

1 See JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs,
113th Cong. 104 (2013) [hereinafter JPM Whale Trades Hearing] (statement of Ina R. Drew, Former
Head, Chief Investment Office, JPMorgan Chase & Co.).
2 Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne, ‘London Whale’ Rattles Debt Market, WALL S T. J., Apr.
6, 2012, at A1.
3 See JPM Whale Trades Hearing, supra note 1, at 156 (report by the Majority and Minority
Staff of the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t
Affairs) (describing the severity of JPMorgan’s losses); Katy Burne, Making Waves Against ‘Whale,’
WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2012, at C1 (“J.P. Morgan sold so much of the index swaps . . . that the cost
of default protection on that basket of companies fell sharply . . . . [After JPMorgan stopped
trading, t]he cost of [default protection] on the index rose . . . .”).
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JPMorgan’s vulnerability on the trades, and for misleading the public and
regulators about the trades’ size and its embedded loss.4
B. The Conventional Corporate Governance Wisdom
JPMorgan’s senior management stumbled badly. The antibank critique
is that the lapse shows how banks are still taking too many risks. At Senate
hearings on the Whale and the loss, senators argued that the Whale debacle
justified moving financial trading largely out of banks because future losses
could be even larger—so large that they could lead to another bailout. As is
now well known, big financial firm managers have reason to accept otherwise
too-large risks in too-big-to-fail financial firms: If the risk pays off, shareholders gain and managers get big bonuses. If the risk turns out badly, then
shareholders and other financiers of the firm are unhappy, but the government
will bail out many of them. This makes the downside for a too-big-to-fail
financial firm not as unpleasant as it would be for a typical industrial firm,
which would have to file for bankruptcy when a major risk turns out badly.
But this risk-taking view has been met by a powerful rebuttal favoring a
“hands-off ” approach, arguing that the bank’s shareholders, and not the
public, bore the brunt of the loss.
1. A Loss Well Within Shareholders’ Equity
Compare the size of the Whale’s trading loss to the size of JPMorgan.
The loss, albeit tremendous, amounted to less than one-third of JPMorgan’s
2012 profits and only three percent of its $200 billion of capital.5 It was well
within shareholders’ equity and, the bank’s defenders assert, is a shareholder
problem, not a public problem. “Why should the public be worried,”
JPMorgan supporters asked, “about that loss in a year of otherwise extraordinary profit for the bank?”6
4 See JPM Whale Trades Hearing, supra note 1, at 165 (report by the Majority and Minority
Staff of the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t
Affairs); Editorial, Lessons from the London Whale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013, at SR10.
5 See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 62 (Feb. 28, 2013).
6 William Jaenike, Letter to the Editor, JPMorgan’s Trading Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar 24, 2013,
at BU5. JPMorgan’s former CEO William B. Harrison said, “It was disappointing to all of us that
we had that kind of loss, but the important thing is to put it into perspective, which the market didn’t
do very well . . . . A lot of people overreacted to it.” Dawn Kopecki, Harrison Says Public Overreacted
to JPMorgan’s CIO Trading Loss, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-09-05/harrison-says-public-overreacted-to-jpmorgan-s-cio-trading-loss.html. Consider the
view of a senior banking analyst: “The holding company made $29.9 billion in operating income
and just over $20 billion in net income for 2011. . . . [T]he reported losses, in and of themselves,
are not likely to have a dramatic impact on J.P. Morgan’s long-term financial stability.” Gene
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2. Shareholder- and Board-Based Governance Will Remedy
Serious losses can activate shareholder-based corporate governance in
industrial firms. Shareholders agitate for boardroom change; boards often
replace senior managers; and, in extreme cases, shareholders force the
breakup of a too-big-to-manage firm into its constituent business lines.7
A big industrial firm that is far above its optimal size should attract such
attention, and often enough does. Perhaps the same could become a reality
for too-big financial firms. Indeed, Henry Kaufmann, long one of Wall
Street’s leading financial analysts, announced that the heyday of the large
American financial conglomerate was over.8 Shareholder value in financial
firms would be enhanced by spinoffs, breakups, and divisional buyouts.
Since that kind of restructuring would enhance shareholder value, shareholders would make it happen.9 America’s financial conglomerates would be
restructured in the 2010s in the same way that America’s overgrown industrial conglomerates were restructured in the 1980s. Other mainstream
analytics have been similar.10
One could extend this corporate analysis. Internal forces can restructure
the too-big conglomerate. Managers at financial divisions could buy out
their division if it can be better managed when separated from the firm’s
core. Boards reviewing the firm’s future strategy could conclude that far-off
divisions cannot be managed well and should be spun off. Activist shareholders might undertake proxy fights to elect new directors to bring about
operational changes. Such proxy fights often fail,11 but firms often eventually
implement policies similar to those sought by the shareholder activists.
Ordinary corporate governance measures could therefore diminish potential
financial losses of the size of JPMorgan’s London Whale trading loss.
Regulation was needed, in this view, only to handle the chance that the loss

Kirsch, J.P. Morgan Chase: Putting Losses in Perspective, WEISS RATINGS (May 11, 2012),
http://www.weissratings.com/news/articles/jp-morgan-chase-putting-losses-in-perspective.
7 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 357-62 (2d ed. 1995).
8 Henry Kaufman, Big Banks Are Not the Future, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2012, at A15 (“The
halcyon days of large financial conglomerates are over.”).
9 Id.
10 See Lionel Barber, The Fall of the Universal Bank, ECONOMIST: WORLD IN 2013, Nov. 8,
2012, at 142 (“The decline of the universal bank will pass unlamented. The . . . financial supermarket has long been eclipsed by the destruction of shareholder value after the crash.”).
11 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 677
(2007); Steven M. Davidoff, Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Do Outside Directors Face
Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis, HARV. BUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200552.
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would exceed the value of the bank’s equity, because only that kind of loss
would put the public fisc at risk.
*

*

*

Overall, a plausible analytic for JPMorgan and the $6 billion Whale
loss—and one with which reasonable analysts agree—is that (1) the problem
is one for shareholders and managers, not the public, and (2) the normal
forces of corporate governance would press to right-size the big financial
firms, if they are indeed operating at too big a scale. That powerful defense
of JPMorgan was embedded in its CEO’s comment that the loss was “[a]
tempest in a teapot.”12
II. STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION DUE TO THE IMPACT OF
TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL
We take this standard corporate incentive-for-efficiency story, deepen it,
and then explore how too-big-to-fail pressures warp the incentives of
shareholders, boards, and managers, thereby degrading corporate governance. Some financial firms may become both too-big-to-manage (an idea
discussed in the literature13) and, because the normal corporate governance
constraints turn off due to the too-big-to-fail subsidy (an idea that, although
not in the literature, is our focus here), the firm is thereby rendered even
more susceptible to both specific error—such as the failure of senior
management to oversee the trading desk properly, resulting in the $6 billion
London Whale—and general error—such as the firm swelling beyond its
optimal size and scope because the optimal size would lose the too-big-tofail subsidy. This potential for systematic organizational degradation at toobig-to-fail firms is extensive, important, and not yet well analyzed.
Normal shareholder, managerial, and board incentives and pressures to
right-size and restructure firms degrade and disappear in too-big-to-fail
financial firms. Too-big-to-fail status lowers the firm’s cost of capital, and
that funding advantage would be lost to the firm by an operationally
12 JPM Whale Trades Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman,
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs).
13 E.g., Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, The Big Banks: Too Complex to Manage?, CENTRAL
BANKER, Winter 2012/2013, at 8; Neil Irwin, JPMorgan Is Close to a Record $13 Billion Settlement. Is
It Too Big to Manage?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/20/jpmorgan-is-close-to-a-record-13-billion-settlement-is-it-too-big-tomanage; Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Too Big to Manage: JP Morgan and the Mega Banks, HARV. BUS .
REV. BLOG NETWORK (Oct. 3, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/10/too-big-to-manage-jpmorgan-and-the-mega-banks.
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sensible restructuring. The threat of losing that value acts as a poison pill
does in an industrial firm: Operational value could be created if a shareholder activist succeeded, but due to the pill, the activist cannot capture that
value for itself. Knowing that it cannot capture the value that it wants to
create, the activist desists from activism. Improving the too-big-to-fail
organization is not, here, in shareholders’ interests. Worse than the pill, the
subsidy also curtails internal incentives for boards, managers, or any controlling shareholders to right-size their financial firm to be operationally
efficient. The private incentives induce affected firms to be less efficient
than they would otherwise be.
A. Too-Big-to-Fail as Poison Pill
A simple poison pill works as follows: The corporate board issues preferred
stock to its current shareholders. If a control-altering event occurs (such as a
single stockholder accumulating more than 10% of a firm’s common stock),
then the terms of that preferred stock issue allow each old shareholder to
redeem his or her preferred shares for, say, ten shares of new common stock
for each old share of preferred stock. The new 10% shareholder-intruder,
however, is barred by the terms of the old preferred stock from participating
in the exchange for new stock. The pill dilutes the activist shareholder’s
common stock, poisoning its incentives to be active: it would have ten
percent of the common stock and be ready for action operationally, but,
anticipating that remaining stockholders would dilute her 10% holding, the
activist shies away from buying up the target firm’s stock. In other variations, the poison has the target making a large payment to a supplier, or
losing a key supplier, if control shifts inside the firm.14
The too-big-to-fail subsidy works analogously. If the subsidy lowers the
financial firm’s financing costs, then the activist who is confident that it can
fix the target firm’s business must also swallow the “poison” of the target
firm losing that funding subsidy. A restructuring would need to be big
enough to recover this funding loss before change agents could profit from
enhancing a financial firm’s corporate efficiency.

14 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 7, at 741-47. Structural impediments to takeover, such
as lucrative contracts for the target firm that expire upon the change-of-control of the firm, are
even more analogous to the too-big-to-fail subsidy: the structural impediment would visit the
costs of the change-of-control on all shareholders, as does the loss of the too-big-to-fail funding
advantage, whereas the pill visits its costs on the activist in the first instance. See generally Jennifer
Arlen, Regulating Post-Bid Embedded Defenses: Lessons from Oracle Versus PeopleSoft, 12 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (2007).
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B. Too-Big-to-Fail as Breakup Protection
Consider the weakened incentive for internally generated spinoffs and
breakups. Suppose a financial firm’s board decides that one of its businesses
does not fit well with the firm’s overall strategic plans and that keeping it in
the firm is holding down its stock price. It plans to sell it, or spin it off. The
financial firm would then plan to retire the debt that it had originally used
to finance the misfit.
But as long as decreased funding costs due to the too-big-to-fail subsidy
make up for the shortfall resulting from degraded operations, the board and
managers should find it profitable to hold onto the misfit. The board may
explicitly realize that the subsidy and lowered cost of funding have this
negative operational impact. Or they may find that when they seek to sell
the misfit, the investment bankers come back to the board with low bids
from firms that are not too-big-to-fail. The bids are low because the bidders
lack access to the same cheap, subsidized funding that the too-big-to-fail
firm enjoys. The board can conclude that the spinoff is a bad deal for them,
without having consciously sought to obtain, retain, or even analyze the toobig-to-fail subsidy.
C. Too-Big-to-Fail as Stymieing the Managerial Divisional Buyout
Firms often divest divisions and subsidiaries that have come to fit poorly
with the rest of the firm’s business. Managers at an orphaned division
commonly buy out their division. They borrow considerably, find some
equity capital for the buyout, and buy up a division or a subsidiary that they
are motivated to run well.15 The too-big-to-fail subsidy weakens both the
buyers’ and sellers’ incentives for the divestiture or the buyout. The buyer’s
cost of funding is higher than that of the too-big-to-fail firm. The subsidiary’s
managers find their funding costs cannot support the buyout. They may
believe that they will increase the division’s profitability by 50% after the
spinoff, but their funding costs would be 50% higher than those of the
parent company. The parent company board will consider the managerial
buyout, but they will ultimately find the price too low. This process could
even occur without the parent firm’s managers or board being aware of the
15 See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND A CQUISITIONS 7 (2d ed. 2007) (asserting that
divestitures are common when an acquisition fails and is undone); DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT &
F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND E CONOMIC EFFICIENCY 167-68, 171 (1987);
Steven N. Kaplan & Michael S. Weisbach, The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from Divestitures, 47
J. FIN. 107, 113, 133 (1992) (finding that 22% of divestitures in the sample studied were sold to
management groups); Michael E. Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, HARV.
BUS. REV., May–June 1987, at 43, 52.
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subsidy. The managers or the board compare the funding costs of the
buyout with the value of the division and find that the numbers do not
match, attributing their cheaper funding to their own superior efficiency.
D. The Required Takeover Premium
Consider now the extreme corporate governance restructuring that occurs
via a breakup takeover. Reducing the chance of a takeover is not the most
important degradation due to subsidy—to the contrary, hostile takeovers are
rare now even for industrial firms, financial regulation impedes takeover in
the banking and other financial industries, and the most important incentive
degradation occurs inside the financial firm rather than outside it. But
examining the antitakeover incentives illustrates vividly the transactional
possibilities foreclosed by the too-big-to-fail subsidy.
Historically, the premium needed to effectuate a takeover was an offer
50% above the pretakeover price of the target firm’s stock.16 That needed
premium is roughly comparable in size to the 33% or bigger subsidy derived
from several postcrisis studies.17 As such, assuming that a bank’s unsubsidized operations would earn $2, its profits would be $3 due to the subsidy. If
the bank lost that subsidy in degraded operations—putting the profit level
back to $2—then a takeover activist would find a takeover unprofitable, even
though it believed it could raise the firm’s profitability (and presumably its
stock value) by 50%—back to the pretakeover $3.
Consider this antitakeover problem in greater detail. If a financial firm’s
profitability is $2 per annum, and its stock price is $20, then the takeover
entrepreneur who believes it can make the firm worth $30 by raising the
firm’s annual operating income to $3 or breaking it up into parts worth $30
in the aggregate, may offer up to a 50% premium over the ongoing price of
$20. A deal would be viable between the market price of $20 per share and
the takeover activist’s assessment that the firm can be turned into a $30-pershare firm.
But if, due to the subsidy, the financial firm’s stock price is already trading
at $30 and earning $3 per share annually, the takeover entrepreneur would
realize that it could not profit from a takeover. Even if it could add $1 per
share to the overall annual operating earnings by restructuring the firm, the
firm would only be worth $30 per share—not $40 per share—if the operationally sensible restructuring induced the bank to lose its too-big-to-fail
status and the accompanying subsidy of $1 per share.
16
17

GILSON & BLACK, supra note 7, at 600.
See infra Table 1.
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The takeover activist, after running these numbers, would withdraw.
Even if it were confident that the target financial firm could be put on a
sounder operational foundation, it would desist from agitating for its takeover
and breakup. Thus, the too-big-to-fail firm has become takeover-proof.
A large too-big-to-fail subsidy would similarly dilute, reduce, and quite
plausibly eliminate the board’s incentive to proceed with operationally
profitable restructurings on behalf of shareholders. Even a controlling
shareholder would likely desist, unlike an efficiency-minded controller of a
large but not too-big-to-fail industrial firm.
*

*

*

Related channels of corporate governance degradation are in play, involving excess leverage, misshapen executive compensation, increased risk, and
how the too-big-to-fail subsidy incentivizes lobbying for poor regulation.18
Before considering these channels, however, we first examine the data on
too-big-to-fail financial institutions.
III. THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BEING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: DATA
The data on the too-big-to-fail subsidy comes primarily in two forms:
First, rating agencies estimate the difference in quality between the big
banks’ stand-alone strength and their enhanced strength with the government backup. The ratings showed a large postcrisis gap between the two,
with the gap narrowing more recently. Second, economists measured the
subsidy either by comparing funding costs of large and small banks to
estimate how much less expensive the big banks’ debt financing costs are, or
by comparing the cost of deposits above the insurance limit with the cost of
insured deposits. (We examine in Part VII the corporate structural consequences of banker claims that the too-big-to-fail subsidy has been, or will
soon be, eliminated.)
These numbers seem at some level small—eighty basis points per annum
in some of the larger estimates, or less than a one-percent discount on the
amount charged to the banks on their borrowings.19 But consider the size of
the too-big-to-fail subsidy as a fraction of big firm profit. That is, we
convert all existing estimates into the value to shareholders. The too-big-tofail subsidy has amounted to a large fraction, sometimes half, of the big
banks’ shareholder profits in many studies, and 15% or so of profits in the
18
19

See infra Part V.
See infra Tables 1 & 2 and sources cited therein. (A basis point is 1/100 of one percent.)
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lower estimates. Losing these sums—15% to 50% of profits—would be
serious setbacks.
A. The Data: Concept
A straightforward example illustrates why small funding savings of, say,
one percent per annum on a financial firm’s borrowings could have a big
impact on its profits and, hence, shareholder value.
Financial firms are heavily leveraged. Take one worth $100, with 10% of
its funding coming from stockholders’ equity and 90% from debt.20 Assume
that equityholders expect a rate of return of 20% at this firm’s level of risk.
In other words, they want a return of $2 each year.
The lenders estimate that while the chance of failure is only 1 in 100
annually, failure would be a total operational loss were there no government
bailout. But because the lenders anticipate that the government will bail the
firm out and pay them the $90 lent if the firm fails, the lenders lower the
interest rate they charge by 1% because the 1 in 100 chance of failure will not
be costly to the lenders.21 The lenders’ willingness to lower their charge to
the firm thus reduces the firm’s cost of capital by 0.9% (from 1% of 90), or
90 basis points. That small percentage of total value is nearly half (45%) of
the $2 of profit that the heavily leveraged equityholders seek. The subsidy is
vital to shareholder profit, and losing it would be very serious.
B. The Data
Extensive evidence suggests that larger banks have had lower funding
costs than smaller banks.22 But that does not in itself tell us whether the
source of their funding advantage is efficiency, subsidy, or something else.
Examine Figure 1, based on Moody’s postcrisis ratings for the big banks.
Moody’s rates the quality of loans made to the banks. It separately rates the
banks on their standalone credit quality and on their full credit quality,
which adjusts the standalone value for the likelihood that the government
will support the bank if it were to fail or otherwise be unable to pay back
lenders.
20
21

Ignore here that insured deposits make up some of that debt.
Ignore that small depositors are always paid in a bank failure; that short-term lenders and
large depositors have usually been paid; that others, like long-term bond market lenders, are often
paid; and that some classes of firms, like large insurers and investment banks, are new to the toobig-to-fail arena.
22 Ata Can Bertay, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Do We Need Big Banks? Evidence
on Performance, Strategy and Market Discipline, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 532, 544 (2013). But
recent evidence shows that gap is narrowing.
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As the graphic shows, during and after the financial crisis many large
financial firms in the United States received a substantial credit quality
upgrade due to the presence of the de facto government guarantee. Citibank,
for example, was rated A3 on an overall basis, or investment grade, while
rated Baa3 on a standalone basis. This standalone rating made it near junkbond quality because there would be a substantial chance that the firm
would default on payment during the life of the relevant bonds.23 This gap,
although now narrowing, has been common for the larger banks.
Figure 1: Moody’s Bank Debt Ratings, with and without Government Backing24

Standalone Credit Assessment, including any shareholder group support
Systemic Support

Aaa
Aa1
Aa2
Aa3
A1
A2
A3
Baa1
Baa2
Baa3
Ba1
Ba2
Ba3
JPMorgan

Goldman
Sachs

Morgan
Stanley

Citibank

Bank of
America

23 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, KEY DRIVERS OF RATING A CTIONS ON FIRMS
WITH GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS OPERATIONS 13 ( June 21, 2012) [hereinafter KEY
DRIVERS] (footnotes omitted). Moody’s has recently been changing its mind, coming to believe
that regulatory efforts will end too-big-to-fail bailouts. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE,
MOODY’S CONCLUDES REVIEW OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT US BANKS (Nov. 14, 2013)
[hereinafter MOODY’S CONCLUDES REVIEW]. For the corporate governance consequences of

the switch—if investors come to believe it to have happened—and the possibility that optimists
are moving faster than the data warrants, see Part VII.
24 KEY DRIVERS, supra note 23, at 7 exhibit 4. Perceptions of improved regulation have
more recently narrowed the Moody’s gap.
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About a dozen recent academic and regulatory studies measured the toobig-to-fail subsidy in two ways. First, the studies measured the change in
this subsidy’s level after the financial crisis, and second, they examined the
ongoing level of the subsidy. The studies, summarized in Tables 1 and 2 in
the Appendix, have results in the same general range, with a mean increase
from pre- to postcrisis amounting to one-third of 2009 profits (Table 1) and
an ongoing support level of nearly one-half of the averaged 2006, 2009, and
2012 profits (Table 2), with its size spiking in 2009. Some studies converted
the rating agencies’ judgments in rating differences into a measure of annual
subsidy of the firm's debt,25 while others used credit default swaps on bank
debt26 or different banks’ cost of funds.27 Others measured the different
rates on deposits above and below the formally guaranteed amount28 or
differences in bond pricing29 or stock returns.30 Although the studies’ time
periods, firms studied, and techniques used differed, their bottom line
results were remarkably similar, with the size of the increase amounting to a
major fraction of large financial firm profits.
Consider one prominent study in more detail, a 2011 study associated
with the International Monetary Fund—“Quantifying Structural Subsidy
Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions,” by Kenichi Ueda
and Beatrice Weder di Mauro—which has typical results.31 Using rating
agency results, the authors calculated the funding cost advantage from the
25 See ZAN LI, SHISHENG QU & J ING ZHANG, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, QUANTIFYING
THE VALUE OF IMPLICIT G OVERNMENT GUARANTEES FOR LARGE FINANCIAL I NSTITUTIONS 14 (2011); Bryan Kelly, Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Too-Systemic-to-Fail:

What Option Markets Imply About Sector-wide Government Guarantees (Chi. Booth, Research Paper
No. 11-12, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762312.
26 See LI, QU & ZHANG, supra note 25, at 13; Frederic A. Schweikhard & Zoe Tsesmelidakis,
The Impact of Government Interventions on CDS and Equity Markets 2 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573377.
27 See Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy,
CENTER FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 1-2 (Sept. 2009), http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf.
28 See Stefan Jacewitz & Jonathan Pogach, Deposit Rate Advantages at the Largest Banks 4-7
(Feb. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018474.
29 See Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees 6-7 (Dec. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656.
30 See Elijah Brewer III & Julapa Jagtiani, How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-to-Fail
and to Become Systemically Important, 43 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 1, 4 (2013); Priyank Gandhi & Hanno
Lustig, Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), available at
http://www.afajof.org/details/journalArticle/5437471/Size-Anomalies-in-U_S_-Bank-Stock-Returns.html
(same).
31 Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3830 (2013).
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better rating due to government backup. They estimated that the funding
subsidy increased by twenty basis points (0.2% annually) during the financial crisis, presumably because lenders raised their estimate of the government’s willingness to bail out a wide range of firms and because the
likelihood of bank failure seemed higher than usual. Because financial firms
use so much debt and so little equity to finance themselves (with debt ten or
twenty times the size of their equity), saving funding costs of 0.2% annually
on the debt can amount to 15-20% of the banks’ profits.
Baker and McArthur, authors of another prominent work measuring the
size of the too-big-to-fail subsidy, also focused on funding cost changes over
time. During the precrisis years, from 2000 through 2007, larger banks with
more than $100 billion in assets had a funding cost advantage over smaller
banks of 0.29%. This advantage widened during the 2007–2009 financial
crisis to 0.78%, an increase of 49 basis points, presumably because the big
banks were seen as likely to be bailed out, while smaller financial firms were
not. This increase translated to an annual funding cost advantage for the 18
large banks of $34 billion, an amount equivalent to half of the financial
firms’ combined 2009 profit.
Table 2 summarizes the measured baseline levels of the too-big-to-fail
advantage of the big financial firms, reconfigured as a percentage of profits
and averaged over their 2006, 2009, and 2012 profits. Overall, the data point
to a substantial baseline advantage, amounting to a noticeable fraction of
financial firm profits, with the size of the advantage increasing noticeably
during the financial crisis. An IMF study with later, 2013 data had results
with a similar bottom line.32
Big banks surely have size-based efficiencies and big firms’ bonds are
more liquid than small firms’ bonds.33 It is possible that the big banks have
32 Int’l Monetary Fund, How Big Is the Implicit Subsidy for Banks Considered Too Important to
Fail?, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 101, 104, 114 (Apr. 2014).
33 See Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Who Said Large Banks Don’t Experience Scale
Economies? Evidence from a Risk-Return-Driven Cost Function, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 559,
578-80 (2013); GLOBAL MKTS. INST., GOLDMAN SACHS, MEASURING THE TBTF EFFECT
ON BOND PRICING 3 (2013), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/publicpolicy/regulatory-reform/measuring-tbtf-doc.pdf. For reviews of the evidence concluding that big
finance is inefficient, see Richard Davies & Belinda Tracey, Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of
Implicit Subsidies on Estimates of Scale Economies for Banks, 46 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 219
(Supp. 1 2014); Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Are Banks Too Big to Fail or Too Big to
Save? International Evidence from Equity Prices and CDS Spreads, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 875, 893
(2013); Robert DeYoung & Chao Jiang, Economies of Scale and the Economic Role of Banks
(May 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.vgsf.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/
P/DeYoung_and_Jiang_May_22_2013.pdf; and Hulusi Inanoglu et al., Analyzing Bank Efficiency:
Are “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Efficient? 15-16 ( Jan. 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://michaeljacobsjr.com/InanogluJacobsLiuSickles_BankEfficiency_1-7-12.pdf. Cf. John H.
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efficiencies from scale economies and also benefit from substantial too-bigto-fail distortions. Some probably enjoy oligopolistic profits. Each boost to
profitability probably fluctuates over time.34
A large fraction of the postcrisis funding advantage, however, seems
likely to have come from the too-big-to-fail subsidy. The studies in Table 1
measure the increase in funding advantages for big finance after the financial crisis. Since it is highly unlikely that big finance became more efficient
due to the crisis, the measured increase seems best attributable to the
market seeing too-big-to-fail support as increasingly likely.35 Several
historical studies analogously attributed financial firm mergers to the desire
to obtain the too-big-to-fail funding benefits.36 A recent study with more
finely tuned empirics finds a large part of the funding advantage due to
subsidy effects, not efficiency.37
*

*

*

Nevertheless, too-big-to-fail is a variable, not a constant. If big finance
shrinks, becomes more stable and less interconnected, or becomes better
regulated, the too-big-to-fail subsidy can decrease, as bank spokespeople and
some analysts now argue has been occurring. Below, in Part VII, I address
the sharp corporate governance consequences one should observe if the toobig-to-fail subsidy dramatically shrinks.38
Boyd & Amanda Heitz, The Social Costs and Benefits of Too-Big-to-Fail Banks: A “Bounding”
Exercise 11-12 (Feb. 8, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://casee.asu.edu/
upload/TBTF_AER_Final_New_Title.pdf.
34 For an examination of the corporate consequences if the high too-big-to-fail subsidy disappears, see infra Part VII.
35 Davies & Tracey, supra note 33, at 221-22.
36 See Edward J. Kane, Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer
from Event-Study Evidence?, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 671, 673 (2000) (“[A]ny merger
that strengthens market presumptions that a megabank acquirer is ‘Too Big to Fail and Unwind’ . . . lowers that entity’s financing costs.”). But see George J. Benston et al., Motivations for
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions: Enhancing the Deposit Insurance Put Option Versus Earnings Diversification,
27 J. MONEY, C REDIT & BANKING 777, 787 (1995). See generally Michael C. Keeley, Deposit
Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1183, 1198 (1990).
37 João Santos, Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” Subsidy, FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2419682. Santos compares the gap between bond yields for big and small firms in banking,
financial institutions outside of banking, and all firms. The banking gap is noticeably larger,
evidencing that the bank bonds’ funding strength is due in major part to their too-big-to-fail
boost. (Santos measures the too-big-to-fail boost in several ways, with measures ranging up to a 92
basis-point boost. For the Table 2 measure, we used the lowest averaged measure that he reports,
41 basis points.)
38 See infra Section VII.B.

1438

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1419

Moreover, even if the too-big-to-fail subsidy is, and stays, measurably
large, the subsidy’s size does not tell us with certainty that the corporate
governance distortions must also be large. Perhaps the degradation is small.
After all, nonfinancial firms without a too-big-to-fail subsidy misjudge
risk—the Exxon Valdez debacle, BP Petroleum’s Gulf of Mexico blowout,
and Union Carbide’s Bhopal tragedy each had risk-mismanagement characteristics akin to the London Whale. For the analytic here to have importance,
the corporate governance degradation must be empirically important, but
hard measures of that degradation are few.39
Finally, note that most studies focus on deposits and long-term debt
rates to derive a too-big-to-fail subsidy. But for the biggest too-big-to-fail
banks, much of their funding and operations are in non-deposit, short-term
debt—the famous derivatives (usually bets on movements of interest rates,
currencies, and other financial items) and repos (short-term, often overnight
repurchase agreements). Derivatives and repo contracts are effectively
prioritized over bonds if the bank fails.40 Because small banks do not use
these types of short-term debt, the fact that the big banks’ long-term debt
gets paid after their short-term debt means that, all else equal, their longterm debt is riskier. Accordingly, it should cost more than the smaller banks’
long-term debt. Similarly, counterparties to too-big-to-fail firms should be
more willing to do business with them than with firms that need to stand on
their own. This preference will translate into better contracting terms,
greater business volume, or both for the too-big-to-fail firms. This too-bigto-fail benefit may well be large and is not captured in traditional measures
of the benefit, because it flows from better short-term financing and contracting opportunities into shareholder profit.
IV. THE EXTENDED SOCIAL COSTS
The too-big-to-fail bailouts at public expense during the 2007–2009 financial crisis were a source of public anger, inducing Congress to have “no more
bailouts!” as an organizing rationale for the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress’s
39 Because the too-big-to-fail boost resembles the monopolist’s profit boost, and monopoly
degradation is better understood, see infra note 47 and Sections IV.A–B, one might expect the
magnitude of the degradation to be similarly important. But analogues are not the same as
measured costs. We do know that “banks with a higher probability of government support . . . have more trading assets on average” and take on more risk. Gara Afonso, João Santos &
James Traina, Do “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Take on More Risk?, 20 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON.
POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2, 9).
40 See Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator,
63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 581-82 (2011); Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives
and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 114-16 (2005).
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major reaction to the financial crisis.41 But, as we have argued thus far, the
cost of too-big-to-fail finance is not just in bailouts, and not just in the more
important financial disruption that major financial failure inflicts on the rest
of the economy. In addition, the financial firm degrades organizationally.
The costs are direct—the degraded financial firm contributes less to the
economy—and indirect—because the structural degradation increases the
chance that the firm will fail in a crisis. In this Part, we extend the analytics
of these social costs and see how they resemble those of the monopolist. I
do so for two reasons. The too-big-to-fail umbrella resembles a monopolistic
or oligopolistic umbrella and oligopolistic organizational deterioration; the
analogy thereby illustrates. And, since markets for some financial products
are organized oligipolistically, market structure provides a wider umbrella to
corporate governance corrective action, one I mention here but do not
analyze further.42
A. The Monopolist’s Rectangle
The classic costs from monopoly come first from the monopolist raising
its selling price above its own full costs. Consumers pay more and the
monopolist gets richer.
Figure 2: The Social Costs of the Monopolist’s Rectangle

Price
Demand
Pm

Supply

P*

Qm

Q*

Quantity

41 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
42 Cf. Mark J. Roe, From Antitrust to Corporation Governance: The Corporation and the Law,
1959–1994, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 102 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996).
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As the monopolist raises its price, some consumers who would have purchased at a lower, competitive price decide not to buy at the higher price.
Only the high-value users continue to buy. The monopolist restricts production, selling only to high-value consumers and letting sales to ordinary
consumers fall by the wayside. The loss from the restricted production is
represented by the small triangular shape in the middle of Figure 2, often
called the “deadweight costs” of monopoly.43
That standard view was transformed in the 1970s, in ways relevant to
too-big-to-fail corporate degradation.44 The monopolist’s profit, represented
by the rectangle in Figure 2, had long been seen until then as a simple
transfer from consumers to monopolist.
But the value of this gain to the monopolist induces it to defend that
gain. The monopolist protects its monopoly and that rectangle of profits
from attack—from upstart competitors, from regulators and other lawmakers,
or from technological change that could displace the monopolist’s business.
Its investments in self-protection are social costs, however—deadweight
damage to the economy as egregious as the lost production of the monopoly
triangle. The monopolist will invest in this socially costly monopoly protection in an amount up to the value of that rectangle.
Worse, there is considerable evidence of organizational degradation in
publicly owned firms with market power.45 The cushion of monopoly profits
coming into the firm allows boards and senior managers to dissipate some of
that value and still provide the firm’s shareholders with a good return.
B. The Subsidy as Analogous to the Monopolist’s Rectangle
The too-big-to-fail problem is analogous. The monopoly cushion degrades the monopolist’s performance; the too-big-to-fail subsidy degrades
the too-big-to-fail firm’s operational performance. Begin with Figure 3,
which illustrates banks’ supply and demand curves for funding in a fully
43 Oligopoly has analogous “deadweight costs” if a small group of firms coordinates a price
above their own costs. The too-big-to-fail financial sector more resembles the oligopoly context
than the monopoly one. But the social costs of monopoly are easier to illustrate graphically than
the oligopoly structure, and nothing is lost conceptually by using monopoly instead of oligopoly.
44 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807,
810 (1975) (representing monopoly profits by the rectangle in Figure 2, supra); cf. Gordon Tullock,
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 225-26 (1967) (“[T]he
rectangle . . . measures the social cost of this waste.”).
45 For the bank-based literature here, see generally Franklin R. Edwards, Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking, 85 J. POL. ECON. 147 (1977);
and Timothy H. Hannan & Ferdinand Mavinga, Expense Preference and Managerial Control: The
Case of the Banking Firm, 11 BELL J. ECON. 671 (1980) (finding office expenses and employment
levels rise in banks in concentrated markets).
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competitive, nonsubsidized environment. (We introduce the subsidy in
Figure 4.) The sector seeks funding for its projects, with the x-axis representing the quantity of funding sought and the y-axis representing its cost.
The earlier projects sought are the highly profitable projects, so the sector is
more willing to pay to finance them. Later projects are less profitable, so the
sector will not pay as much. The demand curve slopes downward, as is
typical. The supply curve is flat here, showing a single interest rate being
charged to the firm. The point where the supply and demand curves meet,
at the intersection of P* and Q*, represents the price that clears the market.
Q* could also be taken to represent the size of the sector: funding is demanded for operations that the sector can implement profitably.
Figure 3: Supply and Demand for Funding an Unsubsidized Too-Bigto-Fail Sector
Price (cost
of bank

financing)

P*

Q*

Quantity of
financing

Next, introduce the too-big-to-fail subsidy. Because financiers to the
too-big-to-fail sector believe they are likely to be repaid even if the financial
firm fails, they charge less interest than if the firm’s failure would surely be
visited upon the lender. Lenders are thus willing to lend more cheaply to
the too-big-to-fail sector. This willingness is represented by the supply
curve moving downward, as in Figure 4.
If the too-big-to-fail financial firms and their managements only pocketed
the subsidy, production would stay at Q*. The cost of the debt would be
lower at PS, yielding the firms savings in their cost of capital at the difference
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between the competitive cost of funds, P*, and the subsidized cost, PS. If
the financial firm did nothing further, it would enjoy subsidized extra profits
represented by the rectangle in Figure 4, amounting in size to (P*- PS) x Q*.
Eventually one of the financial firms would fail and be bailed out. The
predicted cost to the government would be the sum of the rectangles
through time, paid to the financial firm’s creditors.
Figure 4: The Too-Big-to-Fail
Sector’s Rectangle of Potential
Corporate Degradation
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Figure 5: The Too-Big-to-Fail
Sector’s Economically Unwarranted
Expansion
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These then are the well-perceived costs of the system having too-big-tofail firms.46 Consider next the added corporate degradation.
The organizations degrade due to the presence of that rectangle. The
firms’ managers are not as careful, because the extra profits from the subsidy
cushion them, and the normal corporate controls on major corporate
degradation are gone: breakups and some takeovers, and indeed any
46 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE S PECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (Apr. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_25_2012_Report_to_Congress.pdf (“A significant
legacy of [the Troubled Asset Relief Program] is increased moral hazard and potentially disastrous
consequences associated with institutions deemed ‘too big to fail.’”); Ensuring Ohio Taxpayers Don’t
Pay for Wall Street’s Failure, SHERROD BROWN, SENATOR FOR OHIO (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/newsletters/ensuring-ohio-taxpayers-dont-pay-for-wall-streetsfailures (“Wall Street megabanks . . . receive taxpayer-funded advantages today simply because of
their ‘too big to fail’ status.”); Richard W. Fisher, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall., Remarks
Before Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs: Comments on Monetary
Policy and ‘Too Big To Fail’ (Feb. 27, 2013), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/news/
speeches/fisher/2013/fs130227.cfm (“[F]irms capture the financial upside of their actions but largely
avoid payment—bankruptcy and closure—for actions gone wrong . . . . Such firms enjoy implicit
subsidies relative to their non-TBTF competitors.”).
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improvement that makes the firm unsinkable, would cause the firm to lose
the subsidy, represented by the rectangle in Figure 4. The entire rectangle
can potentially be lost to the economy.47
The subsidy initially makes shareholders in the too-big-to-fail sector
richer. But the too-big-to-fail sector can go down another path. First, big
finance has reason to expand the scale and scope of its activities. With the
new cost of funding to the sector at the lower PS, the sector can take on new
activities with the new, cheaper financing available to it. It can move its
funding size and activity scale out to QS. These added activities, represented
by the shaded area in Figure 5, would be more efficiently handled elsewhere
in the economy. The too-big-to-fail sector takes them on because the sector
obtains the subsidized, low-cost funding when they do so. As a result, the
too-big-to-fail sector becomes bigger and more unwieldy.
C. The Degradation as Another Channel to Financial Crisis
Thus far we have examined how a too-big-to-fail boost degrades financial firm efficiency. Another cost emanates from the degradation of their
efficiency, because financial firms at the hub of the economy then function
worse than they need to. Failures of financial institutions can be costly to
the economy, as we learned again during the 2007–2009 financial crisis,
when financial institutions failed, shrunk, and withdrew from lending,
thereby weakening the economy.
Moreover, because corporate governance degradation weakens the firm,
it becomes more likely to fail. That weakness and failure induce further
financial failure during a crisis, exacerbating and deepening the basic
economic costs of a financial crisis, as Figure 6 illustrates.

47 Competition inside the too-big-to-fail sector needs to be accounted for. We consider this
competition in the next Part, where we see that the too-big-to-fail subsidy distorts the competitive
arena in the sector.
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Figure 6: The Too-Big-to-Fail Corporate Degradation Channels
Corporate degradation
a) Takeover barrier
b) Spinoff disincentive
c) Warped shareholder,
board incentives

(3)
Corporate costs

Corporate value lost in
too-big-to-fail
financial firms

(2)

Too big
to fail

(1)

Too-big-to-fail costs
a) Less lending
b) Panic
c) Economic downturn
d) Bailouts

Figure 6 illustrates the multiple channels of too-big-to-fail costs. Arrow (1) and the
right-hand box represent the standard problems: if a big financial firm collapses, the
government will typically bail the firm out. But the too-big-to-fail problem also moves
through a corporate governance channel, via arrow (2), to degrade the corporate quality of
the subject financial firms. The degraded firms are costly for the economy, because they do
not function as well as they could, leaving too many big financial firms at the upper right
corner of Figure 6, weakened via arrow (3). And then, lastly, arrow (4) shows that the
degraded financial firms have a greater chance of failing, due to the too-big-to-fail corporate
degradation, raising the chance that the economy will suffer from too-big-to-fail costs at the
bottom right of Figure 6.

V. FURTHER CORPORATE DEGRADATION
Related degradation channels outside the core corporate governance
institutions of boards and shareholders have been observed before. The
corporate governance degradation problem I have analyzed here widens
several of these known channels. First, the subsidy perniciously induces
affected firms to increase their overhanging risky debt, which distorts corporate strategy. Second, for too-big-to-fail finance, shareholder-oriented compensation incentivizes boards and managers to use more of the too-big-to-fail
subsidy and to avoid capital structures that use less of it, further degrading
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the financial firm’s value to the economy.48 Third, the subsidy distorts the
competitive arena for the too-big-to-fail sector: in the industrial sector,
competition can reverse corporate governance degradation; but in the
financial sector, competition can also further debase corporate structure.
Fourth, the too-big-to-fail firm distorts prosecutors’ and regulators’ actions,
in ways that can further degrade corporate governance. Finally, the financial
players’ unwillingness to lose the too-big-to-fail subsidy impels them to
create larger, more unwieldy firms—a result that is worse for the economy.
I expand on several of these channels to show how the corporate degradation analytic deepens these problems.
A. The Subsidy as Debt Overhang
Thus far we have seen how the too-big-to-fail subsidy destroys basic
corporate governance incentives. It also distorts capital structure decisions.
Capital structure choices can influence the firm’s choice of investments and
can enhance, or degrade, managerial decisionmaking.49 Too much debt
induces managers, if loyal to their shareholders, to accept excessive risks
that the creditors pay for if the risks turn out badly, but that the shareholders
profit from if they yield good results.50
Moreover, a shareholder-oriented firm with a lot of risky debt may forgo
profitable projects, because the benefits go disproportionately to the overhanging risky debt.51 Too little debt, on the other hand, could induce
managers to forgo extra effort because there are no creditors to challenge
them if the managers forgo a few dollars of extra operational income.
Hence, in the normal science of capital structure, there’s a tradeoff.
The too-big-to-fail subsidy distorts this tradeoff. Typically the government does not bail out stockholders of the too-big-to-fail firm—only

48 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 257-61 (2010) (discussing how banker compensation incentivizes executives toward greater
risk); Sallie Krawcheck, Four Ways to Fix Banks, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2012, at 107, 109-10
(same); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1227-28 (2011) (proposing “debt-like” compensation to
decrease executive risk-taking); Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, Executive
Compensation and Risk Taking 3-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 456, rev. Nov.
2011), available at www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr456.pdf (advocating linking executive
compensation to credit default swap spreads to discourage risk-taking and encourage adequate
capitalization).
49 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986).
50 See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 149-55 (1977).
51 Id. at 149.
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creditors.52 Hence, the difference in the cost of equity funding and debt
funding is larger for the too-big-to-fail firm, pushing its board and shareholders to favor yet more debt in the firm. The firm will be overindebted,
motivated to forgo solid opportunities for riskier ones.53 The long-run
corporate governance interest of the depositors’ guarantor diverges from
that of the shareholders.54
Prior work has shown how leveraged firms incentivize stockholders to
take higher risk because the risk is borne disproportionately by the firms’
preexisting creditors, while stockholders disproportionately benefit from the
upside of risk-taking. The concept in this Article is related. Even riskpreferring stockholders should want the firm to be well managed; they just
want it to be riskier. But, as we have seen, most of the standard corporate
mechanisms by which they could achieve that better management are less
sensible for self-interested shareholders of the too-big-to-fail firm.
B. Competitive Failure and Marketwide Degradation
Competitive capital markets incentivize industrial firms to be more efficient than otherwise. For financial firms, the same process could be at work,
but it is weaker.55
In the presence of a major too-big-to-fail subsidy for debt, competition’s
impact on financial firms could be to degrade their efficiency. To corral the
private benefit of the subsidy, firms that can get the subsidy have reason to
compete to maximize it.56 But maximizing this private benefit then insulates
the firm from the useful corporate governance incentives at work in competitive environments lacking this private benefit. As long as the private
benefit exceeds the expected value of the corporate governance incentives,
52 Bear Stearns was an exception, in that the banking authorities merged Bear into JPMorgan,
with the Bear stockholders receiving some value.
53 ANAT A DMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG , THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES (2013). The
excess leverage of the too-big-to-fail bank is an important corporate governance problem induced
by the too-big-to-fail subsidy. In this Article, I instead examine the general corporate governance
costs of structural distortion that the too-big-to-fail subsidy induces.
54 See Peter O. Mülbert, Corporate Governance of Banks After the Financial Crisis: Theory, Evidence, Reforms 19-20 (ECGI Law, Working Paper No. 151/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1448118 (explaining that depositors’ interest is in the ability of the corporation to pay its
debts).
55 See Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential Approach to
Financial Regulation, J. E CON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 3, 23-25.
56 Cf. Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, Fallacies,
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially
Expensive 39 (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2065, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669704.
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competition incentivizes the firm to maximize the private benefits, not the
overall benefits for the economy.
Worse, competition in the too-big-to-fail sector is not always on matters
that are in the public interest. Too-big-to-fail institutions may shift their
businesses from markets in which they compete primarily with other
financial firms, such as the market for major loans, into markets where
major competitors do not get the too-big-to-fail subsidy, such as derivatives
trading in which their balance sheet strength and implicit support makes
them more desirable trading partners than smaller hedge funds. The latter
might fail, but the too-big-to-fail firms cannot.
Or, the big firms direct their competition toward innovative ways to obtain, expand, and use the too-big-to-fail subsidy, not to better service the
economy. For example, credit default swaps, originally pioneered at JPMorgan, were one of the major innovations in big finance in recent decades.
Their original purpose was to reduce regulatory requirements on bank
loans.
The credit default swap innovation at JPMorgan had it turn to an AAA
investment-grade firm for an obligation that, in the event of a default on the
underlying loan, the bank and the AAA-rated firm would swap the bank’s
loan for the AAA firm’s cash. In effect, the AAA firm guaranteed the loan.
Regulators treated such swap-guaranteed loans as equivalent to the bank
lending to an AAA-rated firm, so they did not require more capital to back
up the loan. With the AAA backstop, it was thought that the loan could not
contribute to the bank’s failure. Many of these credit default swaps were
written by AIG, the huge, once-investment-grade insurer whose failure,
partly due to its overexposure in the credit default swap market, was a key
event in the financial crisis. In effect, innovation maneuvered the financial
system to be burdened with more too-big-to-fail low-cost financing than it
would have had otherwise. This innovation was a competitive advantage to
JPMorgan,57 one that resulted from competition in the too-big-to-fail sector.
But it was not a competitive result that benefited the American economy.
C. Too-Big-to-Jail
Managers and boards about to undertake a dangerous activity, as opposed
to just making honest mistakes, rightly fear that government prosecutors
57 See GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD 64 (2009) (showing how JPMorgan developed credit
default swaps to beat precrisis regulatory capital requirements). For the ongoing persistence of
bank effort to beat the capital requirements and the resulting regulatory pushback, see Brooke
Masters et al., Basel Watchdog to Close Loophole Over Use of Pricey Credit Protection, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2013, at 1.
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may punish them with regulatory restriction or, at the extreme, criminal
prosecution.58 The individual manager’s fear of prosecution could keep him
or her well away from activity that could damage the firm.
But prosecutors are wary of putting too-big-to-fail firms or their managers
on trial. “As Attorney General Eric Holder admitted to the Senate . . . ,
when banks are considered too big to fail it is ‘difficult to prosecute
them . . . . [I]f we do bring a criminal charge, it will have a negative impact
on the national economy.’”59 Another restraint on managers of the too-bigto-fail firm weakens.
D. How Remaining Corporate Governance Pressures Are Weak or
Further Degrade the Too-Big-to-Fail Financial Firm
The too-big-to-fail de facto poison pill does not deter every potential
corporate governance reform pressure. But these pressures are weaker than
at industrial firms, and often only exacerbate the governance problems of
large financial firms.
Shareholders, for example, may embarrass or replace the CEO or restructure the board, all without breaking up the firm. Some shareholders tried
this at JPMorgan Chase following the London Whale fiasco.60 But such
activists cannot capture the full measure of improvements they induce—a
normal deficiency in corporate governance—and, worse for the financial
firm, activist shareholders (1) who improve the target firm would share gains
not only with other shareholders and financial creditors, but also with the
government and the overall economy, blunting activists’ incentives even
more than is usual, and (2) have incentives today to induce the financial
firm to take more government-subsidized risks that degrade the firm and the
overall economy, worsening the governance outcome.
Takeovers of too-big-to-fail firms can proceed nicely—but only if the
resulting firm is too-big-to-fail, carrying the same or an enhanced subsidy.

58 See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Consequences to Managers
for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. E CON. 193, 202-04 (2008) (finding increased managerial
turnover among executives at firms that were investigated); Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee &
Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
581, 606 (2008) (finding that legal penalties are dwarfed by subsequent losses in share value and
firm reputation following the penalty).
59 Richard W. Fisher & Harvey Rosenblum, How to Shrink the ‘Too-Big-to-Fail’ Banks, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 11, 2013, at A17. That is, jailing the senior manager or bringing a criminal action
against the firm itself would negatively affect the too-big-to-fail financial firm and thereby
negatively affect the American economy.
60 See Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Small Firm Could Turn the Vote on Dimon,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2013, at B1.
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The takeover would not be a 1980s offer to break up the target, but one to
build a bigger firm. The recent history of Bank of America taking over
Merrill Lynch and of JPMorgan taking over Bear Stearns is consistent.
VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE: COMMAND-AND-CONTROL VERSUS
INCENTIVE-BASED POLICIES
To say that we have analyzed an underexamined cost of too-big-to-fail
finance does not mean that we can remedy the problem. But the analysis
throws new light on policymaking paths. First, it further justifies existing
policy initiatives to end too-big-to-fail problems. Second, it shows how the
financial industry’s incentives to resist these initiatives might be changed.
Third, it points to new initiatives to better stabilize finance. Fourth, it
reveals the corporate governance consequences we should expect from
successful regulation that diminishes the too-big-to-fail subsidy.
The broadest and most effective policy would be to deny the large financial firms too-big-to-fail status, by regulators either making them indestructible or making their failure tolerable. The too-big-to-fail subsidy
would diminish, funding costs for big finance would stabilize at standalone
market rates, and the incentives toward corporate structural degradation
would decline. Regulators have been making such efforts, and these efforts
continue.
Current banking regulation is one of the barriers to bank restructuring,
and regulators could be more open to a change in control at a financial
firm.61 That is, banking rules now require regulatory approval of a change in
control of the bank,62 and many analysts see these regulations as the primary
barrier to financial changes in control,63 because regulators are wary of
control changes that could introduce more risk into the firm (or because
they tend to protect industry incumbents). A new controlling shareholder
would typically become a regulated bank holding company, thereby affecting

61 Cf. Peter Wallison & Kenneth Scott, Questions About Brown–Vitter (Shadow Fin. Regulatory
Comm. Statement No. 341, 2013), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2013/05/13/-statement-no341-questions-about-brownvitter_12514055289.pdf (recommending enhanced segment reporting to
facilitate buyouts of bank holding company divisions).
62 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g) (2012); Change in Bank Control
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817( j) (2012) (requiring notice to regulators sixty days prior to a person or entity
taking control of a depository institution); Regulation Y of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.2(e), 225.31(d), 225.41(c) (2013) (requiring registration or notice
upon change in “control”).
63 See ADMATI & HELLWIG , supra note 53; Amar Bhidé, The Hidden Costs and Underpinnings
of Debt Market Liquidity (Columbia Univ. Ctr. on Capitalism and Soc’y, Working Paper No. 79,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206996.
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and restricting the activist’s other permitted business lines. (One policy
possibility to explore would be an interim exemption, during which the
offeror downsized the bank.)
The analytic from this Article suggests why shareholders have not been
pushing regulators to ease the regulatory barrier in the same way that they
have pushed the Securities and Exchange Commission for similar kinds of
shareholder influence in industrial firms.64 Regulatory barriers aside, profitoriented shareholders have not had much incentive to restructure and
downsize the too-big-to-fail financial firm because doing so would lose the
subsidy. Indeed, inviting shareholders to seek restructuring, without any
other change to shareholders’ distorted incentives in financial institutions, is
decidedly not a solution—shareholders’ incentives still do not match the
public’s in reducing corporate degradation and financial risk. Unless the
shareholders’ incentives change, shareholder-induced restructurings alone
are no solution. Better policy initiatives are needed to align private incentives with public goals.
A. Severe Command-and-Control: Mimicking the Takeover and
Breakup Market
The corporate governance analytic here resonates with three policy
efforts. Two are mainstays of regulatory thinking, one is not.
One obvious mainstay is for the government to break up the big banks—
a favorite among severe antibank critics from the left and the right.65 The
government would complete the corporate restructuring in big finance that
the poison pill quality of the subsidy impedes.
But a government breakup policy is unwise. The government is poorly
suited to formulate and implement a breakup plan well. Years of litigation
and politicking could cost more than the cure. And big finance is heterogeneous: Some firms will be obvious candidates for breakup (for example,
separating Bank of America from Merrill Lynch, or Citigroup overall), in
that they would never have arrived at, nor could they survive at, their scale
64 See, e.g., Submission from the Council of Institutional Investors to the U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n on SEC Release Nos. 33-9086, 34-61161 (Aug. 3, 2010) (SEC File No. S7-10-09).
65 Compare William Greider, Bank-Buster Brown, NATION, April 1, 2013, at 8 (explaining that
Senator Sherrod Brown seeks the breakup of the largest U.S. financial service companies), with
Fisher & Rosenblum, supra note 59; Boyd & Heitz, supra note 33, at 1 (indicating that “the
potential benefits to economies of scale are unlikely to ever exceed the potential costs due to
increased risk of financial crisis”); and James Pethokoukis, Too Big to Fail Is Too Good to Resist,
NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/343804/too-big-failtoo-good-resist-james-pethokoukis (noting that the Senate voted 99-0 against “too-big-to-fail”
subsidies).

2014]

Structural Corporate Degradation

1451

and scope without the too-big-to-fail subsidy. But once decisions become
more nuanced, the government will be ill-suited to reconstruct the financial
industry because some too-big-to-fail financial firms may be efficiently sized
and the government could not precisely sort out the efficient from the
inefficient.
Moreover, the private value of the constituent firms when broken apart
would be less than their value in the financial conglomerate with the
subsidy. The government officials who engineered the breakup would have
destroyed private value and would struggle to show why that loss of financial firm value was socially worthwhile. That the lost subsidy was not a loss
to the economy would be hard to explain.
B. Mainstream Command-and-Control: More Equity, Restricted Activities
One prime policy response to the financial crisis from regulators and
analysts has been to require increased bank equity.66 American regulators
are pushing up bank capital and lowering debt.67 If the once-subsidized bank
were made to have enough equity such that it could not fail, then the toobig-to-fail subsidy would be eliminated and normal corporate governance
pressures and incentives would be back in play.
Activity restrictions have also long been a mainstay of financial regulation. Restricting the big banks’ riskiest activities appropriately would lower
their probability of failure and, hence, reduce the too-big-to-fail subsidy.
The analysis here suggests why such efforts are important. But it also
suggests why they may not succeed: not only will regulators have to grapple
with setting the optimal debt–equity ratio, but the incentives inside the
firms will be to defeat, elude, and override the equity increases, to get toobig-to-fail subsidies back into the firm, and to find ways around limits to risky
activities if the rules are promulgated despite the opposition. Financial firms
reacted to the Brown–Vitter 15% capital proposal quickly and negatively.68
66 See, e.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG , supra note 53; Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk
in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 679-85 (2010); Michael R.
Crittenden & Victoria McGrane, Fed Officials Back Higher Capital, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2013, at C3.
67 See Michael R. Crittenden, Plan Reins in Biggest Banks: Proposal Requiring Extra Capital
Would Force Firms to Be More Conservative or Shrink, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2013, at A1.
68 See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, BROWN –VITTER BILL: C OMMENTARY AND
ANALYSIS (2013), available at http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/files/Publication/
4664ec91-6233-48ed-8645-00db44eeb9fe/Preview/PublicationAttachment/b9d7cae5-07e9-4ccb-8884011abbf0b823/043013_Brown_Vitter_Commentary_Analysis.pdf (criticizing the bill); Terminating
Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act of 2013, S. 798, 111th Cong. (declaring that the purpose of the
act is “[t]o address equity capital requirements for financial institutions”); Jesse Eisinger, In
Brown–Vitter Bill, a Bank Overhaul with Possible Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at B4.
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And, when regulators announced tougher capital rules in July 2013, the
media reported that the firms were already finding ways to avoid the rule’s
impact.69 If regulators could simultaneously realign financial firms’ incentives—not easy, to be sure—they might do better with the regulation now
on the table.
C. Aligning Incentives: Taxing Financial Firms’ Debt
Lastly, we briefly examine a new potential policy effort, one emanating
from the incentive and corporate governance degradation thus far analyzed.
Consider how we now tax banks: the tax structure subsidizes bank debt
and punishes bank equity. This can be changed.
First off, and conventionally, equity is taxed unfavorably compared to
debt: interest on the firm’s debt is deductible from the tax bill, but dividend
payments and returns on equity generally are not.
Although this is standard knowledge applicable to both financial and
industrial firms,70 the distortive impact is greater for financial firms. Because financial firms are more heavily leveraged than industrial firms, their
debt-to-equity taxation imbalance is more severe. Debt amounts to more
than 90% of the average financial firm’s capital structure, while it comes to
less than 50% for nonfinancial firms. And the government subsidizes debt
twice for financial firms: they first obtain the standard tax deduction for
interest, which, given their leveraged capital structure, is very high; they are
then subsidized again with the too-big-to-fail subsidy.
Notice the regulatory contradiction and the distorted incentives. Regulators properly instruct financial firms that they must hold more equity. Then
the government taxes profits on that equity, but reduces those taxes if the
financial firm pays a return to its funds providers in the form of interest,
incentivizing the firm to do the opposite of the get-more-equity regulatory
command. And finally, via the too-big-to-fail subsidy, we further facilitate
financial firms to use more debt and less equity. These debt-based incentives
give financial firms strong reason to defeat regulators’ equity requirements
in multiple forums: first in lobbying, then in transactional workarounds.
Current equity-increasing regulation may not work well if the twin debt
subsidies stay in place. Equity regulation is a command-and-control effort
69 See Tom Braithwaite, Tracy Alloway & Dan McCrum, US Banks to Shuffle Assets over Leverage Rules, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2013 (noting evasion methods such as shuffling assets between
subsidiaries).
70 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A
Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433, 434 (1963); RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS
& FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 472-90 (9th ed. 2007).
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that runs into a wall of the financial firms’ high incentives to defeat the
regulation. To make it work, we should point regulatory and tax policy in
the same direction: instead of taxing the corporate financial entity based on
its profitability, which discourages it from using more equity, the government should tax the financial firm on its level of debt, which would instead
encourage it to decrease debt and increase equity.71
If tax policy no longer subsidized debt and taxed equity, large financial
firms would have more reason to adopt systemically sound capital structures
and to incentivize executives accordingly, and they would do so even
without being hounded by the regulators to increase their capital levels.
*

*

*

This tax change would not be problem-free. As with any tax, the parties
will game it—some financial operations will move into the financial firm if
taxed less there, and vice versa. Tax avoidance would arise. Debts would be
hidden; characterization of transactions as debt would be contested.
But by raising the tax on debt levels, financial firms would find debt
more costly than before. JPMorgan Chase, for example, most recently paid
about $6 billion in annual income tax on its approximately $20 billion of
profit.72 That tax made equity less attractive to JPMorgan, its shareholders,
its board, and its senior executives. A reverse tax structure of taxing debt,
not equity, would leave shareholders, boards, and senior managers with less
reason to use so much debt. Incentives would work in tandem with commandand-control rules. Regulation by instruction should therefore be buttressed
with regulation of incentives.

VII. THE STRUCTURAL OUTLOOK FOR BIG FINANCE WITHOUT A
TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL SUBSIDY
A. Reducing the Systemic Cost of Shareholder-Oriented Governance
One might mistakenly think that the thesis here grates against important
findings that shareholder-oriented corporate governance was detrimental to
financial stability during the financial crisis. But it does not.

71 Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability, 18 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821 (2013); Mark Roe & Michael Tröge, How to Use a Bank Tax to Make the
Financial System Safer, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2014, at 9.
72 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report, supra note 5.
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The basis for questioning the value of shareholder-oriented financial
firm governance is straightforward: as long as there is a strong too-big-tofail subsidy, shareholder interests will find it profitable to take heavy risk,
because a significant fraction of the downside is borne by the government or
by the overall economy, not by the firm and its shareholders. Financial firms
that were more shareholder-oriented,73 firms that had managers compensated more with equity than with debt-like obligations,74 and banks in
countries that favored shareholder governance all did worse in the financial
crisis than their opposites.
All this is true. But these are reasons why the incentives-based corporate
governance analytic is needed. Shareholder-oriented corporate governance
today degrades financial firms because the too-big-to-fail subsidy distorts
corporate governance incentives. If we reduced or eliminated that distortion, then shareholder corporate governance could work better than it does
now. Today, shareholder-oriented American financial firms have strong
private incentives to maintain thin equity layers that offload risk to the
authorities and to the financial system. And, in doing so, the result is to
build unwieldy, misshapen corporate structures. What we should want is to
straighten out those incentives by taking away the too-big-to-fail subsidy,
or—if we cannot eliminate the subsidy directly—to find a way to offset it, so
that incentives inside the big firms change for the better.
B. The Instability of the Too-Big-to-Fail Subsidy
The size of a too-big-to-fail subsidy is constantly in flux. Regulation gets
better or worse. Financial transactions change. The economy improves or
degrades, making failure more or less likely. Bank defenders contend that
the subsidy has disappeared—or at least is disappearing—or that the big
increase in the too-big-to-fail subsidy detected during and after the financial
crisis will subside as the economy stabilizes, as financiers learn from mistakes,
73 See Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some
Banks Perform Better? 105 J. FIN. E CON. 1 (2012); Daniel Ferreira, David Kershaw, Tom Kirchmaier & Edmund Schuster, Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts (ECGI Fin., Working
Paper No. 345/2013, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170392 (explaining that insulation
from shareholders correlated with better bank performance during the economic crisis); Christophe Moussu & Arthur Petit-Romec, ROE in Banks: Myth and Reality (May 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374068 (discussing how bankers’ return-onequity correlated with the “excessive risk-taking” that had a role in the crisis).
74 See Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J.
FIN. E CON. 11 (2011) (exploring the connection between shareholder-focused CEO incentives and
the credit crisis); Sugato Bhattacharyya & Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, Risk-Taking by Banks:
What Did We Know and When Did We Know It? (Nov. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619472.
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and as regulators reconstruct the rules. This possibility of a declining
subsidy leads to two reactions: one of cautious skepticism, which I outline
next, and another of the transactional consequences, which are quite substantial, if and when the subsidy disappears.
First, some skepticism. Big picture pressures can too quickly induce a
policy consensus that the too-big-to-fail problem has been resolved. The
interests of the regulated in minimizing the too-big-to-fail problem are
obvious and need not be detailed. And regulators also have reason to move
on. They are working to implement new legislation, promulgate new
regulation, or bring new vigor in applying longstanding principles. To
acknowledge that the too-big-to-fail problem today is—six years after the
start of the financial crisis—not yet substantially under control would be to
admit that their actions were insufficient, poorly constructed, or poorly
executed. Moreover, a regulatory system can only be on high alert for so
long.75
A strong economy makes financial failure less likely than a weak economy.
Even if policies and firms’ operational risks stay constant, too-big-to-fail
benefits rise and fall with the economy because in a healthy economy, unlike
in a weak economy, firms are less likely to fail. Policymakers and opinionmakers may readily confuse an improved economy—and it usually does
improve after a crisis—for a permanent fix to, rather than a real but temporary respite from, the too-big-to-fail problem. The data suggest a big boost
in the subsidy during the crisis,76 which may be declining,77 but the data also
point to lower but longstanding, substantial subsidy levels outside of the
crisis.78
Pre-Dodd-Frank regulatory opinion shows how easy it is to consider the
financial mission accomplished. Failures, like that of Continental Illinois
and Long-Term Capital Management, induced regulators to reassess failure
possibilities that had seemed remote and unlikely.79 Reforms ensued. But
75 Anjan V. Thakor, The Financial Crisis of 2007–09: Why Did It Happen and What Did
We Learn? ( Jan. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2372449.
76 See infra Table 1.
77 MOODY’S CONCLUDES REVIEW , supra note 23. But cf. Peter Eavis, Moody’s Threatens to
Cut Credit Ratings of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013, at B3 (“Paul Volcker, a former chairman of
the Federal Reserve, expressed skepticism about Dodd-Frank’s wind-down approach. ‘No one in
the market believes it,’ he said.”).
78 Cf. Jesse Hamilton, Bernanke Says Too-Big-to-Fail Banks May Face New Capital Demands,
BLOOMBERG ( July 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-18/bernanke-says-toobig-to-fail-banks-may-face-new-capital-demands.html.
79 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (Apr. 1999); Frederic S. Mishkin,
How Big a Problem Is Too Big to Fail?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 988, 991-92 (2006) (skeptically

1456

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1419

consider this analytic, just before the financial crisis broke in 2007, from a
former Federal Reserve Board governor in a prominent essay: “The evidence does not support a worsening of the too-big-to-fail problem . . . [but
rather a] substantial improvement on this score.”80 New legislation and
better banking regulation had induced “a sea-change in the industry,”
resulting in more bank capital and better bank risk management as the Basel
Accords took effect.81 Moreover, market yields showed no excessively large
too-big-to-fail bounce in long-term bank bonds, as there once had been,82
and relative yields between large (too-big-to-fail) banks and small banks
narrowed or disappeared. This view was unexceptional at the time among
the financial cognoscenti,83 including regulators.84 Yet it was a view expressed as late as 2006—just before the financial crisis and the failures of
AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers.
*

*

*

Nonetheless, the too-big-to-fail feature of American finance is a variable,
not a constant, with its likelihood and its extent rising and falling, expanding
and contracting, from one geographic region and financial sector to another,
and from small institutions to large ones and, perhaps, back again.
Thus, for those who are skeptical about the continuing importance of
the too-big-to-fail subsidy after Dodd-Frank, this Article analyzes what the
corporate governance of the big banks would have looked like if too-big-to-fail

reviewing GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF
BANK BAILOUTS (2004)).
80 Id. at 996.
81 Id. at 997 (noting that by 2004, the largest banks more than doubled their capital ratios
and maintained at least as much capital as smaller banks, possibly reflecting a perception that large
banks were less likely to be bailed out). The 1998 Basel Accord standardized bank capital
requirements internationally and has been praised for increasing focus on risk. Id. at 996.
82 Id. at 996-98 (noting that bond yields, which reflect a bank’s actual riskiness, and narrowing
rate differences suggest that the too-big-to-fail problem “is not as bad as it once was”).
83 A well-respected British banking regulator opined then that “reducing the possibility of
the disruptive failure of a [large and complex financial institution] is a central preoccupation of
public policy. The good news is that the likelihood of such an eventuality is remote.” Andrew
Crockett, Dealing with Stress at Large and Complex Financial Institutions, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL
CRISES 17, 18 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman eds., 2005).
84 Larry D. Wall, Too Big to Fail After FDICIA, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV.,
no. 1, 2010, at 1, 10 (“The net effect of FDICIA should be to reduce interbank risk substantially.
The prompt corrective action provisions and the increase in market discipline . . . constrain bank
risk taking . . . . [T]hese factors should almost eliminate the risk that one bank’s failure would cause
insolvency at other banks.” (emphasis added)).
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had not been cured. For optimists, the analysis provides added reason to be
thankful that the problem is under control.
C. The Dealmaking Impact of Successful Regulation
We have considered here the corporate governance impact of the toobig-to-fail subsidy in causing misshapen, too-large organizations that lack
basic incentives to restructure. The subsidy acts like a traditional poison pill,
deterring outsiders and insiders from improving the organization’s structure. We have also seen that the too-big-to-fail subsidy has been large and
increased sharply during the financial crisis.
Industry players have begun to proclaim that the regulators have already
succeeded and, even if not, they will in due course. Some regulators are
signing on. “Treasury Secretary Jack Lew is arguing that the battle against
too-big-to-fail financial institutions is largely won.”85 The ratings agencies are
also coming around to that view.86 But the most recent academic and regulatory data, although showing soundness improving, indicate that too-big-to-fail
is still real.87 And the IMF’s recent comprehensive measure of the too-bigto-fail subsidy in the United States concludes that the subsidy had narrowed
from its financial crisis high, but was even in 2013 still at about 15 basis
points for bank debt, making “the expected value of government guarantees
85 Neil Irwin, Did Dodd-Frank End Too Big to Fail?, WASH. POST W ONKBLOG (Dec. 6,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/06/did-dodd-frank-end-too-bigto-fail-it-depends-what-you-mean-by-end; see also Michael R. Crittenden, Treasury’s Lew: DoddFrank Law Ended ‘Too Big to Fail,’ WALL ST. J. ( July 17, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/BTCO-20130717-705169.html. For skepticism, see Jesse Eisinger, Soothing Words on ‘Too Big to Fail,’
but with Little Meaning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2013, at B5; and Simon Johnson, Celebrations of Too
Big to Fail’s Demise Are Premature, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
print/2013-12-08/celebrations-of-too-big-to-fail-s-demise-are-premature.html. For regulatory skepticism,
see the FDIC’s vice chair’s view: “Hoenig said the authority . . . in the Dodd-Frank Act to
dismantle a large bank may be effective only in an ‘idiosyncratic’ situation and not a wider
breakdown. In the latter case, lawmakers may be pressured to weigh a bailout . . . .” Jesse
Hamilton, FDIC’s Hoenig Says Another Crisis May Resurrect Bailout Specter, BLOOMBERG ( June 26,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/fdic-s-hoenig-says-another-crisis-may-resurrectbailout-specter.html.
86 See Eavis, supra note 77 (stating that there is a belief “that the government is now more
likely to let large banks fail in a crisis”).
87 See Alexander Schäfer, Isabel Schnabel & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Financial Sector Reform
After the Crisis: Has Anything Happened? (CEPR, Discussion Paper Series No. 9502, May 24, 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2274044, whose event studies around the time the Volcker
Rule (which limited bank derivatives trading) moved forward showed lowered expectations of a
bailout. But, they say, one can “compare our [new] results [with prior results, including] Ueda and
Weder di Mauro[, supra note 31, which concluded] the value of the subsidy as of 2009 was as much
as 60 to 80 basis points funding costs differential. Measured against this benchmark, we would
conclude that none of the national reforms has been enough to fully eliminate the distortion.” Id. at 23.
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for a distressed [major bank somewhat] higher than [our estimate of ] its
precrisis level.”88 Optimists figuratively draw a trend-line—the too-big-tofail problem is diminishing and will be fully under control soon. The
pessimists (realists?) see the current improvements as likely to be the
postcrisis high-water mark, with safety degradation likely to begin as the
crisis-induced alert mind-set becomes less intense.
But what are the structural implications if the optimists and industry
defenders are right?
If the too-big-to-fail subsidy disappears, then corporate restructurings in
big finance that were once not viable should become profitable. Pressures to
reverse the increase in the biggest financial firms’ size should rise.
Misshapen financial firms’ distortions will become more obvious, and
their costs will no longer be largely or fully offset by the subsidy. As that
happens, internal incentives of boards and senior managers will change, and
activists would be able to enter the arena to push to restructure the distorted
financial firms.89 If the too-big-to-fail subsidy is seen to have sharply
declined, we should see more divestitures and breakups.
While the financial industry and some regulators are increasingly happy
to announce that the too-big-to-fail problem has been beaten—just as
several had announced before the financial crisis—the dealmaking, activist
environment is not yet consistent. Although some restructuring has occurred,90
the mega-banks have not yet been heavily involved, and even shareholder
activism is minor: “Although the 2012 and 2013 proxy seasons saw increased . . . shareholder activism across a range of industries, that trend has
not yet made its way to the U.S. banking industry.”91 If the too-big-to-fail
subsidy is gone—or if it goes soon—the dealmaking environment in the
financial sector should change.

88
89

Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 32, at 104, 114.
Large financial firms do sometimes divest. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, JPMorgan to Spin Out
Its Private Equity Unit, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK ( June 14, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/06/14/jpmorgan-to-spin-out-its-private-equity-unit; Steven Marlin, Citigroup Sells Travelers Unit
to MetLife for $11.5 Billion, BANK SYSTEMS & TECH. ( Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.banktech.com/
citigroup-sells-travelers-unit-to-metlif/59300242.
90 See, e.g., Robert Barba, Divestitures on Rise in M&A as Banks Decide Less Is More, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_184/divestitures-on-rise-in-mand-a-as-banks-decide-less-is-more-1062352-1.html; Lattman, supra note 89; Marlin, supra note 89.
91 William Sweet, Shareholder Activism in the US Banking Industry, HARVARD L. S CH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 3, 2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2013/12/03/shareholder-activism-in-the-us-banking-industry.
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CONCLUSION
JPMorgan Chase’s $6 billion trading loss highlighted organizational fragility at the country’s too-big-to-fail banks and helped us understand
corporate governance degradation in big finance.
Defenders of the bank, its CEO, and its senior managers saw JPMorgan’s loss as massive and regrettable, but well within the bank’s earnings, its
huge equity capital, and its more-than-trillion-dollar asset base. Hence, the
problem, they claimed, was one for the bank’s shareholders, its managers,
and its board—not one for extended regulatory concern. Public funds were
never at risk.
But the proper analysis of JPMorgan’s London Whale trades differs.
Shareholder-based corporate governance will not work when there is a large
too-big-to-fail subsidy. Shareholder activists who would break up a lessthan-well-run bank, or divisional heads who would seek to buy out an
orphaned division, would find themselves handicapped in the breakup or
buyout. Not only would they have to make the efficiencies and restructuring
work—which is hard enough—but they would lose the too-big-to-fail
subsidy. The broken-up or spun-off entity would no longer be too-big-to-fail
and its cost of funding would rise. Activist shareholders would have to
overcome a high hurdle, one akin to a corporate transactor’s poison pill.
Firms grow too large for multiple reasons. Managerial error in projecting
economies of scale that turn out to be evanescent is one of the most benign.
Random variation is another. Managerial empire-building is also common,
and a third. The push from the too-big-to-fail subsidy is a powerful fourth.
Whatever the reason for the excessive growth, normal corporate structural
pushback is absent or degraded in the too-big-to-fail financial firm. Boards
that might second-guess expansion have less reason to doubt its profitability
when that expansion is financed with the boost from a too-big-to-fail
subsidy. They need not even be aware of the subsidy; they only need to
notice its effects—that funding costs are lower—and attribute their good
fortune to their own perspicacity.
Measures of the too-big-to-fail subsidy are typically cast as discounts on
the banks’ borrowing rate, with the discount less than 1% per annum. This
number may seem small. But that small number can amount to a noticeable
fraction of shareholder profits—about one-third in multiple postcrisis
studies. That is not a small number. Losing one-third of the profit of the
financial firm would be a serious setback. Since the sharpest tools for
corporate governance must cut through this large profit loss before reaching
corporate operations, the sharpest tools for corporate governance are
blunted or broken in the large, too-big-to-fail financial firm.
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This destruction of the sharpest tools of corporate governance burdens
the economy, revealing a major cost of too-big-to-fail banking: the degradation of financial firm efficiency even without an actual bailout. The core
financial firms are run less well due to the subsidy and are more likely to fail.
The analytics here are an added rationale for the current regulatory
efforts to increase bank capital, restrict risky activities, and make financial
firm failure possible. The analytics also point to how to make the current
regulatory forays more effective. Instead of relying overwhelmingly on
command-and-control regulation that financial firms have large incentives
to resist, reverse, and sidestep, policymakers should now also focus on the
internal corporate governance organizational incentives. They can, and they
should, make the financial firm’s debt more expensive for its managers, board,
and shareholders, while making equity less expensive. Command-and-control
orders to increase financial capital and reduce risky activities are properly
the first regulatory responses, but regulatory styles have diminishing marginal
returns just like other economic activities. The corporate governance
analysis here shows how and why another policy channel based on organizational incentives could be opened. It is not on the current policy agenda, but
it needs to get there.
Regardless of whether we can cure the problem, I have analyzed here in
depth how the too-big-to-fail subsidy degrades the standard, core corporate
structural tools—from the sharpest tool of the takeover, to the incentives for
spinoffs, to the incentives for well-directed shareholder structural initiatives. The corporate governance tools that help to right-size, stabilize, and
make efficient industrial firms, crude and imperfect though they might be,
all weaken or disappear in large-scale American finance.
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Table 1: Too-Big-to-Fail Capital Cost Saving Changes During the Financial
Crisis, Recalibrated as a Portion of Profits
Implied
Equity
Subsidy

Baseline
Result

Sample

Baseline Data

26%

9 to 49
bps
increase in
funding
costs

Institutions
with greater
than $100
billion in
assets in
March 2009

Average
quarterly cost
of funds

18%

20 bps
increase
from end
of 2007 to
end of
2009

All banks
with Fitch
support
ratings
(including
international)

Ratings
support

End of 2009

End of
2007

53%

60 bps
increase in
abnormal
CDS
spread

Financial
institutions
with CDS

Credit
default swap
(CDS) data

2007 to 2010

Precrisis

29%

33 bps
increase in
difference
between
CDS
spreads of
large and
small
banks

Top 20 banks
by assets in
2007,
compared to
small banks

CDS and
Moody’s
Expected
Default
Frequency /
fair-value
CDS spreads

Postcrisis

2001 to
2010

Viral V. Acharya,
Deniz Anginer &
A. Joseph
Warburton, The
End of Market
Discipline?
Investor
Expectations of
Implicit State
Guarantees

41%

56 bps
increase in
funding
cost
advantage

Top 10% (by
size) of SIC
codes of 6064 with U.S.issued bonds

Bond pricing
data from
three separate
databases

1990 to 2010

2007 to
2009

Average Range
Change

33.3%

Study

Dean Baker &
Travis McArthur,
The Value of the
“Too Big to Fail”
Big Bank Subsidy
Kenichi Ueda &
Beatrice Weder di
Mauro,
Quantifying
Structural Subsidy
Values for
Systemically
Important
Financial
Institutions
Frederic A.
Schweikhard &
Zoe Tsesmelidakis,
The Impact of
Government
Interventions on
CDS and Equity
Markets
Zan Li, Shisheng
Qu & Jing Zhang,
Quantifying the
Value of Implicit
Government
Guarantees for
Large Financial
Institutions
(Moody’s Report)

Postcrisis
Period

Precrisis
Period

High case:
Q1, 2001 to
Q4, 2008 to Q4, 2007;
Q2, 2009
Low case:
Q4, 2001 to
Q2, 2002
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In Table 1, we take the measured funding benefit increase from before to after the financial crisis in each study and convert that benefit to a percentage of profits for Baker &
McArthur’s sample of 18 large financial institutions. (Citations to Baker & McArthur and the
other cited items can be found in Section III.B’s footnotes.) So as not to rely on the results
of any single, potentially atypical, year, profits for 2006, 2009, and 2012 are used. The
calculations assume the 18 institutions to have a capital structure that has 10% equity and 90%
debt. For calculating the extent of the subsidy to debt, we reduced this first debt number by
the approximate level of insured deposits in the large bank liability structure (about 25%).
The result both overestimates and underestimates the subsidy. It overestimates it because we
apply it to all debt of the entity, not just the debt whose subsidy effect is being measured.
(Not all debt may be perceived as equally likely to be government-protected as the debt
studied.) The result also underestimates the subsidy, because the too-big-to-fail subsidy will
boost off–balance sheet items and trading activity that do not appear on the financial
institutions’ balance sheets. We use bank holding company assets, liabilities, and profits for
uniformity and availability.
Different averaging measures will lead to different results: (1) one can average the equity
subsidy for each bank, which gives great weight in the overall average to a bank with small
profits in one year, because the equity subsidy can amount to several multiples of low profits;
(2) one can sum the profits for the 18 institutions in a particular year and divide this by the
total equity subsidy for all 18 banks in that year, thereby reducing the potential for one lowprofit institution to skew the results upward (and thereby can include banks with losses,
while method (1) cannot meaningfully include observations of banks with losses); (3) one can
check that the results are similar for the six largest financial institutions that usually are
viewed as too-big-to-fail; and (4) one can use methods (1)–(3), but with a different year’s
profits. The table presents method (2), using 2006, 2009, and 2012 profit levels. In the
unpublished appendix, we calculated the results for methods (1), (3), and (4) (using 2012
profits). The results were approximately the same size.
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Table 2: Measured levels of too-big-to-fail funding cost savings
recalibrated as a portion of profits

Study

Dean Baker & Travis
McArthur, The Value
of the “Too Big to
Fail” Big Bank
Subsidy
Kenichi Ueda &
Beatrice Weder di
Mauro, Quantifying
Structural Subsidy
Values for Systemically Important
Financial Institutions
Viral V. Acharya,
Deniz Anginer & A.
Joseph Warburton,
The End of Market
Discipline? Investor
Expectations of
Implicit State
Guarantees

Priyank Gandhi &
Hanno Lustig, Size
Anomalies in U.S.
Bank Stock Returns

Elijah Brewer III &
Jalupa Jagtiani, How
Much Did Banks Pay
to Become Too-Bigto-Fail and to
Become Systemically
Important?

Implied
Equity
Subsidy

Baseline
Result

Sample

Baseline Data

Time
Period

75%

78 bps
difference in
funding costs
between
small and
large banks

Institutions
with greater
than $100 billion
in assets,
compared to
those with less

Average quarterly
cost of funds,
provided by the
FDIC

Q4,
2008 to
Q2,
2009

77%

80 bps
postcrisis
funding
advantage for
large banks

All banks with
Fitch support
ratings
(including
international)

Credit ratings
(overall, and with
and without
support from
government of
from parent banks)

End of
2009

23%

Funding
advantage
averages 28
bps, peaking
at 120 bps in
2009

Top 10% (by
size) of SIC
codes of 60-64
with U.S.issued bonds

Bond pricing data
from three separate
databases

1990 to
2010

37%

Subsidy for
large banks
averaging
3.1% of
market
capitalization

U.S. incorporated commercial banks,
nondepository
credit
institutions, and
investment
banks

Differences in riskadjusted returns in
bank stocks

1970 to
2009

36%

36%
premium on
acquisitions
by acquiring
firms

8 merger deals
that brought
organizations to
over $100 billion
in assets

Premerger prices
and purchase
prices, and asset
sizes of target and
acquiring firms

1991 to
2004
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Largest U.S.
banks ($100
billion in assets)
compared to all
other banks

Deposit rates
offered at the
branch level

Q1,
2005 to
Q3,
2010

1985 to
2009

2013

38%

39 bps lower
risk premium
paid by larger
banks

40%

41 bps
average
funding
advantage
over bonds of
all types

U.S. banks,
nonbanks, and
nonfinancial
corporations

Bond pricing
between large and
small banks,
compared to
nonbanks and
nonfinancial
corporations

International
Monetary Fund’s
2014 Global
Financial Stability
Report

14%

15 bps
postcrisis
funding
advantage for
largest U.S.
banks

U.S. systemically important
banks as defined
by the Financial
Stability Board

(1) Difference
between fair value
and observed CDS
spreads, and (2)
estimated rating
uplift from
government

Average

43%

João Santos,
Evidence from the
Bond Market on
Banks’ “Too-Big-toFail” Subsidy

In Table 2, we take the measured funding benefit in each study and convert that funding
benefit to a percentage of profits. We used the same method as for Table 1, aggregating
studies that estimated the pre- to postcrisis increase in the too-big-to-fail funding subsidy.

